波音游戏-波音娱乐城赌球打不开

CSC Strives to Ensure a Virus-Free Environment

by Raymond Poon

The Sasser virus and its variants have been rampaging on the Internet since May 2004. According to the information provided by Symantec, Sasser is an Internet worm spreading through the MS04-011 (LSASS) vulnerability.

This vulnerability is caused by a buffer overrun in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, and will affect all machines that are:

- Running Windows XP or Windows 2000
- Haven't been patched against this vulnerability
- Are connected to the Internet without a firewall

Once infected with the Sasser worm, the following symptoms may occur:

- Computer performance is decreased or network connection is slow
- One may see a dialog box that contains text that refers to LSA Shell
- Computer may restart every few minutes without user input

Many organizations and universities worldwide were hit really hard at the time. Fortunately, most of our users hardly noticed this epidemic because:

  1. We, the Computing Services Centre (CSC), have been taking preventive measures by automatically forcing security patches of Windows as well as updates of virus signature files to all PCs on our Staff LAN as soon as these patches and updates become available.
     
  2. We have been proactively urging those users whose PCs are not managed by the CSC (e.g. PC for research, LAB PC, etc) but are detected by our security software tools to be vulnerable to either hacking activities or contracting viruses to take immediate remedial action. If they do not cooperate, their machines will be forced to disconnect from the campus network in order to protect other users on the network.
     
  3. From the past experience learnt, we have been able to identify threats well before they get worse and are deploying security devices at critical parts of the network infrastructure to monitor for abnormal traffic and to limit the potential damages done by new threats or unidentifiable attacks.
     
  4. For those publicly accessible PCs (e.g. those in Lecture Theatres, classrooms, etc) or kiosks that we manage, we install additional security hardware and procedures to further protect our users. For those we do not manage, we have been providing departments with best practices and guidelines on how to secure them which actually are the first point of entry to our network and thus also served as its first line of defense.
     
  5. We have been making use of the Departmental Network Administrators (DNA) and the System & Network Technical Group (SYSNET) to communicate well and share experience with one another on tackling security problems.
     
  6. We have been using statistics gathered from the Help Desk on types and causes of security breaches, users' awareness levels, etc. to establish policies, devise preventive measures and promote user awareness.

Despite these, we still see room for improving our preparation for the next wave of attacks. We still have lots of fire-fighting work to tame the viruses spread by improperly protected PCs on campus as well as those at the student hostels and at home that we practically have little or no control of.

The University community must work hand in hand as a whole to secure our network. After all, the security of our network is only as strong as its weakest link.

百家乐里面的奥妙| 网上玩百家乐技巧| 百家乐官网翻天粤语版qvod| 运城百家乐官网蓝盾| sz新全讯网网址2290| 博彩百家乐官网软件| 东方太阳城二期| 全迅网百家乐官网的玩法技巧和规则 | 博彩网导航| 冕宁县| 百家乐二十一点游戏| 大发888bet亚洲| 百家乐官网庄闲筹码| 在线百家乐安卓| 百家乐官网玩法秘诀| 网上百家乐真实吗| 百家乐正品| 大发888娱乐登陆| 百家乐视频打麻将| 老K| 天堂鸟百家乐的玩法技巧和规则| 金冠百家乐官网的玩法技巧和规则| zaixian百家乐| 大发888资讯网007| 百家乐官网视频聊天软件| 百家乐注码调整| 一起pk棋牌游戏大厅| 网上百家乐骗人的吗| 网络百家乐官网模拟投注| 鼎龙娱乐城开户| 百家乐赌博技巧大全| 永利高百家乐官网会员| 大发888 xp缺少 casino| 百家乐视频游戏视频| 天天百家乐官网的玩法技巧和规则 | 太阳百家乐官网网| 新世纪百家乐官网现金网| 尊爵线上娱乐| 在线百家乐有些一| 网络百家乐官网骗局| 百家乐官网信誉平台开户|